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Abstract
Labor market performance has differed considerably between OECD
countries over the last two decades. The focus of the literature so far has
been to ask whether these differences can be explained by varying degrees
of labor market rigidities and generosity of welfare states. This paper takes a
different perspective and analyzes whether differences in venture capital
investments have explanatory power with respect to labor market
performance across countries and over time. In particular, the Anglo-Saxon
countries have been relatively successful over the last two decades in
producing employment growth and in reducing unemployment compared to
most continental European OECD countries. As a rule they have also been
and are still ahead in developing thriving venture capital markets that are
often deemed crucial for the creation of new firms and for successfully
managing the ongoing radical structural change away from traditional
industrial production toward the so-called “new economy”.
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The persistent rise in unemployment along with the conspicuous lack of job creation in many
continental European countries still begs to be thoroughly explained. Labor market rigidities
along with generous welfare states are often considered to be at the root of the European
unemployment problem.
1 While it seems by now well established that both factors do indeed
matter considerably, it is far from clear that both factors even when taken together constitute a
satisfactory explanation on their own. An obvious problem with this approach is the high
degree of continuity of these institutions over time so that only a combination of these
institutions with adverse shocks is a promising avenue for explaining simultaneously different
labor market performances across countries and changes over time. Furthermore, higher rates
of job creation in Anglo-Saxon than in continental European countries have not been
restricted to low-paid jobs, where labor market rigidities and the generosity of the welfare
state matter most. Yet, it is far less evident why these institutional features should also
obstruct the creation of high paid jobs. Other structural factors, which impact clearly on the
creation of both low and high paid jobs, might therefore have to be considered as well. 
Economic intuition suggests that job creation over the whole wage spectrum should not only
be related to real wage costs and their flexibility in the face of shocks but also to economic
growth and in particular to investments. A possible and hitherto underexplored structural
factor in explaining labor market performance differences across countries and changes over
time are therefore capital market institutions which might affect the ability of economies to
invest especially in risky and new ventures.
2 This type of investment appears to be crucial
though for job creation in the ongoing period of radical structural change away from
traditional industrial production toward the so-called “new economy”, in which new jobs are
                                                
1 See especially Siebert (1997).-2-
rarely created by the expansion of large and established firms such as General Motors,
Daimler Benz, IBM or Siemens. 
A prime suspect in the realm of capital market institutions are the degree to which venture
capital markets are well developed and flourishing. The US especially has benefited from a
fully-fledged venture capital market. A number of studies document the ability of US venture
capitalists to select promising companies, provide adequate financing and spur innovative
firms to behave aggressively and emerge as market leaders.
3 This helped the US to steam
ahead in terms of competitiveness and growth during a time period when innovative change
has been the cornerstone of entrepreneurial success. Although venture capital financed
investments relative to GDP are only a rough measure for the functioning of venture capital
markets, this measure has the advantage of being available for a wide range of countries since
the mid 1980s. Clearly, lack of venture capital financed investments is not necessarily only
due to a lack of supply of venture capital as was for example suspected by the European
Commission some time ago
4, but can just as well be due to a lack of experienced venture
capitalists or due to a demand problem possibly caused by a lack of innovative entrepreneurs
asking for venture capital finance. Total measured venture capital investments obviously
reflect both supply and demand for venture capital, and thus the overall functioning of the
venture capital market. However, a potential problem in using venture capital investments as a
right hand side variable for empirically explaining labor market performance is their possible
endogeneity, i.e., venture capital investments themselves are not exogenous but rather depend
on GDP growth and institutional factors such as the possibility for the venture capitalist to
exit the engagement via an initial public offering. We will account for this potential
endogeneity problem in our empirical estimations.  
                                                                                                                                                        
2 Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1998) and Hubbard (1998) show that financing constraints do indeed matter for
corporate investments and that this is especially the case for risky and new ventures.
3 See e.g. Hellmann and Puri (2000), Kortum and Lerner (1998) and Gompers and Lerner (2001).
4 See European Commission (1998).-3-
It is noteworthy that not all types of venture capital investments are equally likely to lead to
job creation. So called “early stage investments” are especially promising in this respect
because they serve to set up a new firm with possibly new and innovative ideas. Management
buy-outs where corporate insiders in established firms seek venture capital to take control of
their firm appear to be less promising for creating positive employment effects in comparison.
Interestingly, the former type of investment has until 1998 been much more prevalent in the
US compared to continental Europe, where the latter type of investment constitutes a larger
share of total venture capital investment. Hence, not only the total level of venture capital
investments but also their structure appears to be less conducive to job creation in continental
Europe compared to the US. This assessment is reinforced by the fact that banks and
governments are major providers of venture capital in continental Europe, both of which are
unlikely candidates for identifying the types of highly risky investments, which make most
sense from a purely economic point of view. Finally, the two greatest shares of venture capital
investments in continental Europe are devoted to manufacturing and to consumer industry,
whereas in the US venture capital investments are predominantly in the computer,
telecommunications and biomedical industry. Hence, not only the level but also the structure
of venture capital investments in the US appears to be more conducive to job creation from
this sectoral perspective.
5
Given the fact that European capital markets are traditionally bank-dominated
6, it seems
natural to ask why banks in Europe should not be able to play the role that venture capitalists
are fulfilling in the US and other Anglo-Saxon countries. In other words, why do banks
typically refrain from financing start-ups? This could be due to the fact that banks are hardly
suitable financiers for this type of risky project. Raising deposits from the public at large
usually finances bank lending and banks earn profits in this part of their business activities
                                                
5 See Bottazzi and Da Rin (2001).
6 See e.g. Edwards and Fischer (1994).-4-
due to interest rate margins between credits and deposits. The generally high liquidity of
deposits creates pressure on banks to engage predominantly in relatively liquid credit
contracts. Hence, banks need debtor firms which are able to pay them back within a
reasonably short time period and with a high probability and/or which can provide them with
ample collateral, i.e., tangible assets such as property and buildings. These requirements can
hardly be met by start-up firms, which are as a rule highly risky, have no positive cash flows
for some time even in the case that they are fundamentally successful and which invest a large
part of their acquired capital in intangible assets such as software and human capital which
cannot serve well as collateral. Three additional reasons deserve to be mentioned why banks
cannot act as perfect substitutes for US-style venture capitalists. First, the traditionally close
ties between banks and established large industrial firms in a country such as Germany make
banks less aggressive in nourishing possible future competitors of established firms. Second,
due to the fact that the stability of the banking system is a politically sensitive issue,
government regulations result in banks facing severe legal restrictions concerning the
financing of risky investments such as start-ups. Third, banks hardly possess the sector- and
firm-specific knowledge of US-style venture capitalists that is necessary to help young firms
in managing the especially risky start-up and expansion phase.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section Two briefly summarizes the main
results of a recent theoretical paper by Acemoglu (2001) which reflects our intuitive
reasoning. The Third section is the innovative heart of the paper as it provides a detailed
empirical panel data analysis for the conjectured effect of venture capital investments on labor
market performance. The final section sums up the results and presents some conclusions for
economic policy. -5-
II. The model
Acemoglu (2001) has recently proposed a simple but highly plausible formal model where
differences in the ability of economies to channel external funds to new firms plays a key role
in explaining why some economies experience an extended phase of depressed job creation
and persistent unemployment in the wake of the arrival of a new set of technologies while
other economies can adapt much faster to such a technological shock and largely avoid
unemployment problems.
7 Better functioning venture capital markets in Anglo-Saxon
countries in general and in the US in particular compared to continental Europe may reflect
this difference in the ability to channel external funds quickly and smoothly to promising new
entrepreneurs. Steady-state unemployment such as in the 1960s need not differ by much
between the two types of economies in such an institutional setting because entrepreneurs
with promising and innovative ideas will eventually obtain funds possibly even through their
own savings or via loans from the extended family. However, in the medium run the failure of
rigid capital markets with badly functioning venture capital markets to provide quick external
financing to those entrepreneurs who are most promising after a technological shock leads to
an extended phase of depressed job creation and a persistent rise in unemployment because
job destruction in declining sectors cannot be prevented. Hence, according to this model a
direct effect of the functioning of venture capital markets on labor market performance can be
expected in a period of rapid structural change because employment creation depends on the
creation of new firms in the expanding sectors which in turn can only occur on a large scale
and sufficiently quickly if adequate channels of financing such as via venture capital are
available. This fits well with an influential paper by Blanchard (1997) in which he labels
structural unemployment in continental Europe as a medium run phenomenon in the aftermath
of severe shocks. Interestingly, the malaise on the labor market is in some respect self--6-
reinforcing in Acemoglu’s model because higher unemployment in economies with rigid
capital markets leads to lower real wages and thus also to lower savings of workers which
prolongs the time until a worker with post-technology shock entrepreneurial ideas can start his
own business based on his own savings. 
However, structural unemployment can only exist if there also exists at least some basic
rigidity on the labor market. This result holds even under an institutional setting with highly
rigid capital markets because infinite real wage flexibility would always clear the labor
market if labor markets were perfectly flexible no matter how small labor demand is due to
financing restrictions. To avoid this problem, Acemoglu (2001) assumes an efficiency wage
setup that prevents instantaneous labor market clearing via adjustments of real wages. While
efficiency wage problems seem to have indeed become more important with the arrival of the
“new economy” and with the ongoing reorganization of firms towards holistic instead of
Tayloristic production structures
8, it appears that unions, insider-outsider problems and
generous welfare states are still at least as critical in making continental European labor
markets relatively rigid compared to for example the US. The combination of both, rigid labor
markets and capital market institutions which do not fit well with a period of rapid structural
change, can therefore be expected to be harmful to labor market performance because the
quasi-equilibrium employment rate is then restricted from both sides, via more aggressive
wage setting due to labor market rigidities and via depressed labor demand due to an obsolete
institutional setting on the capital market. Hence, the quasi-equilibrium unemployment rate is
higher, the less well the venture capital market works, given the level of labor market
rigidities.
                                                                                                                                                        
7 Two other important models with similar results, namely that credit market imperfections exacerbate structural
unemployment caused by rigid labor markets, have been suggested by Caballero and Hammour (1999) and by
Wasmer and Weil (2000). 
8 See Lindbeck and Snower (2000).-7-
Essentially all recent contributions to this still fledgling literature on the relationship between
imperfect capital markets and labor market performance lack convincing empirical evidence
for the point they are trying to make, i.e., that capital-market imperfections matter for the
level and evolution of employment and of the rate of structural unemployment.
9 The ensuing
section is trying to close at least somewhat this gap in the existing literature via a
macroeconomic panel data analysis. The hypothesis for the empirical analysis is
straightforward. It is conjectured that greater venture capital investments relative to GDP give
rise to more employment and a lower level of structural unemployment in a cross-country
panel analysis for the 1980s and 1990s when structural change has indeed been rapid not least
due to globalization. This positive effect of venture capital investments relative to GDP on
labor market performance should occur even when controlling for the key institutional
variables on the labor market because it is a direct effect of financing restrictions on labor
demand which would only have no employment effect at all if one assumed unrealistically
that the short-run wage setting curve were perpendicular implying counterfactually perfectly
flexible real wages even in the short run. 
III. Empirical Estimation
1. Empirical model and estimation procedure
In this section we estimate the direct impact of variables measuring venture capital on both
employment and unemployment. The model is estimated using panel data on a sample of 20
OECD countries over the period 1987 – 1999. In order to test empirically for the conjectured
impact of capital-market institutions and especially venture capital on labor market
performance we employ a panel of twenty OECD countries, namely Austria (AUS), Belgium
(BEL), Denmark (DEN), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (GER), Ireland (IRE), Italy
                                                
9 See Caballero and Hammour (1999), Wasmer and Weil (2000) and Acemoglu (2001).-8-
(ITA), Netherlands (NET), Norway (NOR), Portugal (POR), Spain (SPA), Sweden (SWE),
Switzerland (SWI), United Kingdom (UK), Canada (CAN), United States (USA), Japan
(JAP), Australia (AUL), and New Zealand (NEW). 
The basic model we wish to estimate is the following, 
, it jit j it it it X GDP VC y ε δ β α+ + + = (1) 
where  yit is the dependent macroeconomic variable for country i in period t (either the
unemployment rate or an index of total employment), VCit is our measure of venture capital
for country i in period t, GDP is the level of real gross domestic product for country i in
period t, included as a cyclical control variable following Wasmer and Weil (2000) and Xjit is
a vector of j additional variables used to control for key institutional variables. In order to
avoid any ad-hoc empirical set-up we strictly stick to the main theoretical argument
developed in section II and just add capital market variables separately to the list of
explanatory variables. 
The above model is static in nature. Especially in the case of labor market variables, there are
reasons to believe that such a model may be dynamically mis-specified. We therefore specify
a second estimating equation: 
, 1 it jit j it it t it X GDP VC y y ε δ β α γ+ + + + = − (2) 
where  yt-1 are lags of the dependent variable. This has the appeal that it models either
employment or unemployment in a dynamic context and as such venture capital can have both
a short-run and a long-run impact. 
Dynamic panel models such as that in equation 2 are characterized by the presence of a
lagged dependent variable. The major problem that arises when introducing a lagged-9-
dependent variable as an explanatory variable is that the error term and the lagged dependent
variable are correlated, with the lagged dependent variable being correlated with the
individual specific effects that are subsumed into the error term. This implies that OLS and
GLS are biased. As such an alternative method of estimating such models is required. 
One proposed solution that removes the individual specific effect is to first difference
equation 2. This removes the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error
term from equation 2, but the transformed error term and the differenced dependent variable,
∆yit, are now correlated (see Nickell, 1981). A solution to this problem however is to use
instrumental variable (IV) techniques. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggest first differencing
the model to remove the individual specific effects, and using ∆yi,t-2 = (yi,t-2 – yi,t-3) or yi,t-2 as
instruments for ∆yi,t-1. These instruments are correlated to ∆yi,t-1, but will not be correlated
with ∆uit = (uit – ui,t-1), as long as the uit are not serially correlated. This IV technique will lead
to consistent but not necessarily efficient estimates of the parameters in the model because it
does not make use of all the available moment conditions
10 (see Ahn and Schmidt, 1995). The
estimator that uses the lagged level as an instrument, yi,t-2, rather than the lagged difference,
∆yi,t-2, is recommended by Arellano (1989) who finds it to be more efficient. Moreover,
instrumenting with the lagged level has the advantage over using the lagged difference, that
only two time periods are lost rather than at least three. Arellano and Bond (1991) propose an
extension of Anderson and Hsiao (1981), which utilizes the General Methods of Moments
(GMM) procedure to accommodate the inclusion of further lagged variables as additional
instruments. Additional instruments can be obtained by utilizing the available orthogonality
conditions that exist between the lagged values of the dependent variable and the errors. Thus
the further advanced the panel, the greater the number of instruments available. The
                                                
10 Moment conditions are conditions on the covariances between regressors and the error term. Regressors may
be orthogonal to the error term, in which case we can use orthogonality conditions, that the covariance between
the regressors and the error term is zero.-10-
advantage of this procedure is that it allows both the cross-section and the time-series
elements of the data to be exploited when constructing valid instruments. The validity of this
approach requires a lack of second order serial correlation in the dynamic specification, so
tests for this are presented with the results. Overall instrument validity is also examined using
a Sargan test
11 of over identifying restrictions. The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is of the
exogeneity of the instrument set. 
We consider a similar specification for both the static and dynamic model. Given the above
discussion therefore, the final estimating equations we employ are: 
, it jit j it it it X GDP VC y ε δ β α∆ + + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ (3) 
and
, 1 it jit j it it t it X GDP VC y y ε δ β α γ∆ + + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ − (4) 
where ∆ refers to the first difference of the variable in question. By taking first differences
from most of our variables, we use a consistent model. One thing to note from these equations
however is that the additional variables accounting for institutional variables are included in
levels rather than differences, these are included in levels since they show little variation
across time. 
Turning to the data used in estimating equations 3 and 4, the appendix at the end of the paper
describes the variables and provides details about the sources of the data. The sample of data
runs from 1986 to 1999, but because of first differencing we lose one observation, meaning
that the dataset runs from 1987 to 1999. 
                                                
11 Following Sargan (1958).-11-
The dependent variable in the models estimated is either the first difference of the
unemployment rate (DUNEMP) or of the index of employment (DEMP). In addition to using
both employment and unemployment as dependent variables we also sequentially use two
measures of venture capital, these being either the first difference of venture capital (DVC) or
early stage venture capital (DINVEARLY). DVC is defined as the seed, start-up and expansion
(both government and private sector funded) as per million of average GDP, while
DINVEARLY is used to account for early stage venture capital only, and is defined as the seed
and start-up (both government and private sector funded) as per million of average GDP.
There is good reason to believe that these variables measuring venture capital may be
endogenous. This is not only valid with respect to the labor market variables but also to
another independent variable, namely real GDP that is used as a cyclical control variable in
our context. Hence, in the case of a significant coefficient of venture capital, one could argue
that the demand for finance has been strong and the supply of venture capital supply has been
stimulated in those countries that have been innovative and able to create jobs (strong
employment growth) and where the macroeconomic climate has been favorable and
macroeconomic policy has been supportive
12. In this case, both employment and venture
capital investment may then be driven by a third factor. Estimated coefficients of venture
capital might then be biased. Hence, to account for the problem of endogeneity of the venture
capital variable and thus for possible reverse causality we instrument the venture capital
variables, employing lags of the variables two periods earlier as instruments.
The additional variables in the model are included to control for key institutional
characteristics. Firstly, we include variables to control for various institutional labor market
variables. As such, we include a measure of the benefit replacement ratio (RR1), a measure of
the duration of unemployment benefits (Benefit), a measure of employment protection
                                                
12 Given that labor market institutions are often badly measured, an alternative view would be that venture
capital may capture their effects.-12-
(Empro), the tax wedge (Wedge) and a measure of the centralization of wage bargaining
(Uncord). These it is expected will adequately control for factors that contribute towards labor
market rigidities, which include high firing costs, strong unions and generous employment
benefits. Secondly, we include a variable to account for the presence of institutional capital
markets, by including an index of the legal system’s protection of creditors in case of a firm’s
liquidation or re-organization (CreditRight). This variable reflects the legal position of
creditors vis-à-vis firms in the case of financial distress.
13.
With respect to the sign on the coefficients of these additional variables included in our
regressions, we expect the following marginal coefficients for the unemployment equations
(and vice versa for the employment equations; question marks represent ambiguous cases)
14.
We expect RR1, Benefit, Empro and Wedge to be positive, while the coefficients on Uncord
and CreditRight are expected to be negative. At the same time we expect that the coefficients
on the changes in the two venture capital variables (DVC and DINVEARLY) would be




In order to convey a broad-brush view on the data set and some of the possible correlations
four scatter plots are presented below. These show plots of our measure of the change in the
unemployment rate (DUNEMP) and the change in our index of employment (DEMP) against
the change in venture capital investment (DVC) and the change in early stage venture capital
                                                
13 Finally, in a number of specifications we also included a set of country dummies, Englaw, Frelaw and Gerlaw,
which are dummy variables taking the value 1 if the country follows English, French or German law
respectively. The remaining group is Scandinavian law countries. In addition, we let the country law dummy
variables interact with either the first differenced value of VC (*dvc) and Invearly (*DINVEARLY) or the level of
VC (*vc) and Invearly (*inv). However, the results turned out to be insignificant in the overwhelming number of
cases. The justification for additionally including them was to let the impact of venture capital on labor markets-13-
investment (DINVEARLY). All variables are averaged for each country over the period for
which we have data for them, which lies somewhere in the region between 1986 and 1999. 


































                                                                                                                                                        
depend on labor market flexibility. However, in this paper we argue for a direct effect of venture capital on labor
market performance.
14 See, e.g., Blanchard and Wolfers (1999), and Layard and Nickell (1997).-14-











































































































Based on a visual inspection of the scatter plots, a negative relationship between the availability
of (early stage) venture capital and changes in unemployment and a positive one with respect to
changes in employment cannot be excluded ex ante. However, any premature and far-reaching-16-
conclusions are based on shaky grounds at this stage of our analysis in view of potential
problems of simultaneity between the respective indicator of labor market performance and the
VC variable. We have already extensively addressed this problem in this section. Hence, we
dispense with estimating a regression line within the scatter plots which would insinuate a causal
relationship with VC as the independent variable.
We started our formal empirical analysis with tests of the non-stationarity of the levels and the
first differences of the variables under consideration. The test we applied was the first widely
used panel data unit root test by Levin and Lin (1992). The results, which are available on
request, reveal that in many cases the levels of the variables are non-stationary, but that the
changes in these variables, which we employ here, are indeed stationary.
Based on our theoretical arguments, we conjecture that controlling for the key institutional
variables on the labor and the capital market, venture capital improves labor-market
performance in a cross-country panel analysis. To test for a significant relationship between
venture capital and labor-market performance, we undertake estimations in differences and
for early stage as well as for total venture capital investment. The models were estimated
using the package Dynamic Panel Data 98 for GAUSS, details of which are provided by
Arellano and Bond (1998). The following Tables display the results from estimating equations
3 and 4. The tables report the coefficient along with heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. The
validity of the dynamic models depends upon a lack of second order serial correlation and the
validity of the instrument set (Sargan test). Results of these tests are reported in the tables. -17-
Table 1: The Impact of DVC on Changes in Unemployment













































































































-0.16 1.68* 0.77 0.71 -0.65 1.58
Sargan Test 5.63 2.74 0.63 55.89 76.74 45.66
Note: All models are estimated using robust standard errors. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, *
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.-18-
Table 2: The Impact of DINVEARLY on Changes in Unemployment

































































































0.44 1.39 1.42 0.03 0.98 1.52
Sargan Test 5.22 0.53 0.68 63.01 77.3 42.06
Note: All models are estimated using robust standard errors. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, *
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.-19-
Table 3: The Impact of DVC on Changes in Employment





































































































1.48 1.5 1.19 -0.31 0.15 -0.26
Sargan Test 6.78 1.48 0.95 62.69 71.54 56.79
Note: All models are estimated using robust standard errors. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, *
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.-20-
Table 4: The Impact of DINVEARLY on Changes in Employment



































































































0.74 1.94* 1.61 -0.57 0.55 -0.42
Sargan Test 13.1 2.05 2.65 61.55 72.6 53.36
Note: All models are estimated using robust standard errors. Values in parentheses are t-
statistics. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
3. Interpretation
To start with, note that the Sargan test for the validity of the instruments is always
insignificant and that the test of second order serial correlation is insignificant in the dynamic
model, suggesting that the models are well specified. Furthermore, if we examine the
coefficients on the additional variables included in the model, the coefficient on the change in
GDP is negative when the change in unemployment is the dependent variable and positive
when the change in employment is the dependent variable, as expected. Moreover the
coefficients of GDP tend to be significant. The coefficients on the institutional variables
included in the models tend to be very small and in only a few cases are they significant. In-21-
addition to a lack of significance, in many cases the coefficients are not of the expected sign.
These results are likely to reflect a number of concerns with the data on these variables.
Firstly, we may expect a great deal of multicollinearity between these variables and the results
are indicative of such a problem, characterized by insignificant coefficients and coefficients
that are not of the expected sign. Secondly, the lack of consistent and significant results on
these additional variables may reflect the fact that they show little variation over time. Given
that our data has a significant time-series dimension to it, we would expect that the
coefficients on these variables would not be as significant as in a cross-section regression for
example, where only the cross-country and not the time-series variation would be important.
Although these problems are likely to be important, it needs to be kept in mind that these are
not the variables of primary interest in this paper and that they are included largely as a test of
robustness on the variable of interest here, namely venture capital. 
Although the institutional variables do tend to be insignificant, there are a number of cases in
which one or more of these variables are significant. In Table 1, Benefit is negative and
significant in Column 5, which is not the expected sign. In Table 2 we find more evidence of
a significant impact of the institutional variables on the change in unemployment, with
Benefit, Uncord and Wedge all being negative and significant in at least one case, although the
coefficient on Uncord is the only variable with the expected sign. Empro is also found to be
significant and with the expected positive sign in one case. In Table 3, Benefit and Wedge are
significant at the 10 percent level in Column 5, the coefficients being positive, which was not
expected, and negative, as expected, respectively. In Table 4, Benefit is once again found to
be significant in one case, with the coefficient being negative as anticipated. Empro is also
significant in one case and negative as expected.
Finally, we can concentrate on the variables representing venture capital. Table 1 examines
the impact of the change in venture capital on the change in unemployment. The coefficients-22-
on DVC tend to be negative as expected (except for Column 2), and in the majority of cases
they are also significant at least at the 10 percent level. The results of the dynamic model are
more supportive of a significant impact of DVC on the change in unemployment than the
static results. Table 2 reports the results when DVC is replaced by DINVEARLY, in order to
examine the impact of early stage venture capital on the change in the unemployment rate.
The coefficients on DINVEARLY are not as supportive of an impact of venture capital on the
change in unemployment as those reported in the previous table. The coefficient is of variable
sign and never significant at standard levels of significance.
Tables 3 and 4 report the results from examining the impact of venture capital on the change
in employment. Table 3 considers the results of including DVC as an explanatory variable in
the model of employment, while Table 4 reports the results from replacing DVC with
DINVEARLY. The results on DVC suggest that it has a positive impact on the change in
employment, as hypothesized, with the coefficient usually being significant. The results from
the dynamic model give us stronger results concerning the impact of venture capital on
employment, with the coefficient always being significant at the 5 percent level. The
coefficients on DINVEARLY have a variable sign in the static model, with the coefficient
being negative in two of the three cases. For the dynamic model and for the remaining static
case however, the coefficient is positive as expected, and significant at the 10 percent level.
Seen on the whole, we would argue that our empirical results produce evidence in favor of our
central hypothesis, namely that venture capital investment does improve labor market
performance, i.e., that it tends to reduce unemployment and to raise employment. However,
our empirical results are not equally strong for all model specifications. The strongest results
are obtained for the change in total venture capital investment DVC within the dynamic model
specification. The coefficients are always significant at least at the 10 percent level and
exhibit the expected sign in all six cases, thus pointing to a non-negligible impact of DVC on-23-
both the change in unemployment and on the change in employment. Our results are neither
quite as strong for DINVEARLY (which does not include expansion investment) nor for the
static results. DINVEARLY exerts a significant positive impact on the change in employment
in one of the three static specifications and in all three dynamic specifications at the 10
percent level in Table 4, but no significant impact of DINVEARLY on the change in
unemployment could be detected in Table 2. The static model produces correctly signed and
significant results only when the institutional variables are left out (Column 1). The
coefficient of the venture capital variable DVC or DINVEARLY exhibits the expected sign in
all four tables in Column 1 and is significant at the 10 percent level in three out of the four
cases. Whenever the institutional variables are included in the static model specification
(columns 2 and 3), the coefficients of the venture capital variable DVC and DINVEARLY
become insignificant, which might be due to the aforementioned multicollinearity and
measurement problems inflicting these institutional variables. 
In sum, our empirical results indicate that the positive effect of venture capital investment on
labor market performance is more dynamic than static in nature possibly due to a time-to-
build period, i.e., it takes time until venture capital investments have realized their full
employment potential via feed-back and trickle down-effects on other firms. These other non-
venture-capital backed firms might benefit, e.g., as suppliers or customers from the venture-
capital backed firms or they improve their products or production processes based on new
ideas of the usually more innovative venture-capital backed firms.
15 If so, the full positive
effect on labor market performance of the venture capital boom in the 1990s in many
countries might actually be realized with some delay during this first decade of the new
millennium. Somewhat surprising is the complete lack of any significant impact of
DINVEARLY on the change in unemployment in Table 2. We suspect that this might be due to
a combination of the time-to build effect, which favors the inclusion of expansion investment-24-
in the estimations, and labor supply moving in parallel to the overall economic development
and thus also venture capital investments. This should be one factor making the measured
effect of both types of venture capital investment on employment more pronounced than on
unemployment, a difference which also shows up when comparing the impact of DVC on the
change in unemployment in Table 1 and on the change in employment in Table 3. 
4. Long-run effects
Based on our dynamic results, it is finally possible to estimate the long-run contribution of
venture capital on un(employment), using the formula ∑∑ − ), 1 /( i i α β  where βi are the
coefficients on the venture capital variables and αi are the coefficients on the lagged
dependent variables. The long-run effect of venture capital for the results displayed in Tables
1-4 is reported in Table 5. 









Column 4 -0.46 -0.33 1.12 3.54
Column 5 -0.51 -1.27 1.16 4.33
Column 6 -0.43 -0.42 1.34 4.02
To understand what these results imply we can use an example. If we take the figure –0.46
from the table, this tells us that a one unit increase in venture capital (i.e. DVC = 1) will
reduce the change in unemployment by 46 percent. If in the absence of the change in venture
capital the unemployment rate would have increased by 10 percent for example (i.e.
                                                                                                                                                        
15 See Kortum and Lerner (1998). -25-
DUNEMP = 10), then with the one unit change in venture capital, the unemployment rate
would increase only by 5 percent. Taking the example of Germany, which had an average
change in the unemployment rate over the period studied of 0.17 percent and an average
change in DVC of 0.1 units, we can calculate that a one standard deviation increase in the
change in DVC (equal to 0.18) would have reduced the change in the unemployment rate by
around 0.1 percent according to the –0.46 figure. While the figure of –1.27 in Column 3
would imply that a one standard deviation increase in DINVEARLY (equal to 0.06) would
have reduced the change in the unemployment rate by 0.08 percent. We can conduct a similar
exercise for employment, these suggest that an increase in DVC by one standard deviation
would increase the change in the employment index by between 0.2 and 0.248. Similarly an
increase in DINVEARLY by one standard deviation would increase the change in employment
by between 0.21 and 0.24. It should be noted that these figures are not too different for DVC
and DINVEARLY. One note of caution in interpreting these figures is that we are using 10
years of data to try and infer the long-run impact of venture capital on un (employment). This
might be inadequate, but the figures identified here may be used as a rough guide.
IV. Conclusions
It is by now well established that flexible labor markets and stringent welfare states improve
aggregate employment performance. However, by leaving out capital market variables, past
empirical results might have missed other important institutional factors and might have
overstated the impact and significance of some of the labor market variables due to an omitted
variable bias. The ability of a country to encourage and sustain technological innovation by
entrepreneurial firms is one of the main sources of economic and employment growth.
Economic intuition suggests that venture capitalists have to play a key role in this respect
because they have especially in the US often been able to provide promising companies with
adequate risk financing. Economists have so far paid relatively little attention to the-26-
possibility of a virtuous circle between a dynamic venture capital industry, a well functioning
stock market and entrepreneurial firms which could be of major help in improving the
situation on the labor market. 
Two of the leading researchers on venture capital, Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, have
recently argued that it is a challenging empirical problem to demonstrate a causal relationship
between the presence of venture capital investment and innovation or job growth.
16 This paper
produces empirical evidence of such a link at the macroeconomic level. As far as we know,
this paper identifies for the first time a significant positive impact of seed, startup and
expansion venture capital investment on aggregate labor market performance within a
coherent, dynamic econometric framework. This result is of particular importance considering
the fact that direct policies to combat unemployment, e.g., by deregulating the labor market or
by trimming welfare state activities, are notoriously difficult to implement in the political
decision process, so that indirect alternative routes such as via fostering the venture capital
market are urgently called for in continental Europe. However, these results should not be
misinterpreted as constituting a justification for government subsidies to the venture capital
industry or for government-run venture capital activities. Rather, the government should
provide an institutional framework which is favorable to the development of a flourishing
private venture capital industry, e.g., by capitalizing the pension system and by allowing
pension funds to invest part of their assets in venture capital firms. Based on the US example,
this should further spur the development of the venture capital market in continental Europe.
17
However, it is also important to keep in mind in this respect that it is not only the supply of
venture capital which might restrict the total volume of investments, but possibly also the lack
of suitable entrepreneurs with innovative ideas. The education system especially at the
                                                
16 See Gompers and Lerner (2001, p. 164).
17 See Jeng and Wells (2000).-27-
university level would be the primary lever to address such a scarcity of able human
resources.  
This paper investigates the real effects of venture capital investment on labor market
performance on the macroeconomic level. Future research could possibly tackle this issue on
a more disaggregate level. On an a priori basis it seems that venture capital investment affects
labor demand for qualified workers more than for unqualified workers. Hence, the positive
effect of venture capital investment on labor market performance should be more pronounced
for qualified workers alone than for the total labor market. Furthermore, one could compare
directly on the firm level whether venture capital backed firms grow more in terms of
employment than suitable control firms with almost identical initial conditions except for the
difference that those control firms do not receive financial support and advice from a venture
capitalist.
18 
Finally, the venture capital revolution could be another case for a robust correlation between
financial factors and economic growth that is consistent with a leading role for finance.
Historically, GDP and job growth as well as the opening up of economies, nowadays often
called globalization, have usually been finance-led. The availability of superior and more
sophisticated financial systems have in the past often been key factors in letting countries
jump ahead in terms of economic development and in engaging in more cross-border trade
and capital flows.
19 This is possibly a self-reinforcing process or virtuous circle. Financial
development is typically blocked by incumbents who try to protect their quasi-rents.
Anonymous financial markets do not respect the value of incumbency and treat entrants more
favorably than financial markets based on relationships. However, when outside opportunities
improve dramatically and when pressure from abroad increases via trade and capital flows,
                                                
18 Engel (2001) is a first attempt for such an approach. This microeconometric paper finds empirical results along
our lines, namely that venture capital backed firms grow more in terms of employment in Germany. 
19 See Rousseau and Sylla (2001).-28-
such a behavior of incumbents becomes more and more inefficient and thus self-defeating.
20
Hence, viewed from an interest-group perspective it is not surprising that the ongoing process
of globalization goes hand in hand with a dramatic change in the way firms are financed and
with a rising role of venture capital.  
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Appendix








Civilian or (if not available) total economy employment (employees
and self employed, index with base year 1995). Source: OECD Main
Economic Indicators.
Real gross domestic product (GDP) Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators
Institutional labor market variables
Benefit replacement ratio
(RR1)
Average replacement rate over the first year of an unemployment spell.
Source: Blanchard and Wolfers (1999), pp. 11 ff. and data appendix.
Three realizations per country (for 1986-89, 1990-94 and 1995-99).
Indicator displays more variability than RRATE.
Benefit duration
(BENEFIT)
Duration of unemployment benefits (years, 4 years meaning indefinite).
Source: Layard and Nickell (1997), pp. 11 ff., and complementary data
delivered by S. Nickell.
Union coordination index
(UNCORD)
Union co-ordination in wage bargaining. Index with 3 = high, 2 =
middle, 1 = low. Source: Layard and Nickell (1997), Table 3, and
complementary data delivered by S. Nickell.
Employment protection index
(EMPRO)
Country ranking with 20 as the most strictly regulated. Source: Layard




Total tax wedge (in %). Sum of the payroll tax rate, the income tax rate
and the consumption tax rate. Average rates derived from national
income and tax data. Source: Layard and Nickell (1997), p.4, Table 1,
and complementary data delivered by S. Nickell.
Venture capital investment time series
Venture capital investment
(VC)
Seed, startup and expansion (both government and private sector
funded) as per mil of average GDP. Source: Own calculations based on
Asian Venture Capital Journal (2000), Baygan, Freudenberg (2000),
European Venture Capital Association (2000), National Venture Capital
Association (2000), Jeng, Wells (2000)
Early stage venture capital investment
(INVEARLY)
Seed and startup (both government and private sector funded) as per mil
of average GDP. Source: Own calculations based on Asian Venture
Capital Journal (2000), Baygan, Freudenberg (2000), European Venture
Capital Association (2000), National Venture Capital Association
(2000), Jeng, Wells (2000)
Institutional capital market variables
Creditor rights
(CREDITRIGHT)
Index of the legal system’s protection of creditors in case of a firm’s
liqidation or reorganization. Range: 0 to 4, 4 is the highest level of
creditor protection. Source: La Porta et al. (1998), p. 1136, Table 4.